Artikel 3 og 8 krænket ved politifolks brug af politistave og ransagning. Den anvendte magt og ransagning var uforholdsmæssig, da politiet alene havde efterforsket ejerforholdet til en uaflåst bil

En større gruppe studerende boede sammen i et hus, da politiet omkring kl. 03.00 om natten kom forbi huset og opdagede, at der uden for huset holdt en uaflåst bil parkeret. Politifolkene bankede på et vindue til huset for at forhøre sig om ejerforholdet til bilen, som politiet troede var stjålen. Beboerne sov, men nogle vågnede op som følge af politifolkenes henvendelse. Politiet spurgte efter bilens ejer, som viste sig at opholde sig i huset. Der er mellem parterne enighed om, at der udviklede sig en diskussion mellem nogle af de unge mennesker og politiet. Politifolkene anholdt en af de unge mennesker, som de i forbindelse med anholdelsen gav nogle slag med en politistav. Derpå udviklede der sig en konflikt, og politifolkene tilkaldte forstærkning, hvorefter der kom flere patruljer og specialpatruljer til stedet. Der var nu omkring specialtrænede politifolk med hunde og stave til stede. Nogle politifolk trængte ind i huset, og alle beboerne blev beordret til at stå op af en væg udenfor. To af de unge klagede til menneskerettighedsdomstolen. To dage efter episoden blev de lægeundersøgt, hvor det viste sig, at de havde fået meget overfladiske skader på kroppen. De oplyste, at mærkerne stammede fra slag med politistave.

EMD lagde vægt på, at den omhandlede magtanvendelse og indtrængningen i huset stod i misforhold til, at det var en meget beskeden forbrydelse (ejerforholdet til den uaflåste bil), der skulle efterforskes.

I det følgende gennemgås relevante præmisser på dansk. Derpå følger hele afgørelsen på originalsprog (engelsk):
 

l Sagens omstændigheder

6. Klagerne er født henholdsvis i 1973 og 1976 og bor i Wagrowiec.

7. Parterne er ikke fuldtud enige om sagens faktiske omstændigheder, som kan gengives således:

1. Som gengivet af klagerne

8. Den anden klager boede sammen med en gruppe venner herunder den første klager, i det væsentlige studerende, i et gammelt og forfaldent hus, som de havde lejet i Wroclaw. De inviterede med mellemrum vender til at overnatte eller tilbringe nogle dage i deres hus.

9. Om natten den 14. juni 1997 sov der en gruppe studerende i huset. Klokken 3 om natten blev de vækket af to polititjenestemænd, der var på patrulje i området. Politiet forespurgte, hvorvidt beboerne kendte noget til ejeren af en uaflåst bil, der var parkeret foran huset.

10. Klagerne samt en af deres venner, DS, begyndte en høflig diskussion med politifolkene om bilen. Det blev bekræftet, at en af beboerne i boligen var ejeren af bilen. Politiet meddelte, at de havde til hensigt at få bilen slæbt hen til politistationen. Klagerne anførte heroverfor, at det ikke var forbudt at efterlade sin bil uaflåst. På politiets forlangende fremviste de deres identitetskort og registreringsattesten vedrørende bilen, hvis ejer lå og sov i huset.

11. Politiet var ikke tilfreds med deres forklaringer og uenighederne blev stærkere. Som reaktioner på meningstilkendegivelserne om politiforretningen navnlig fra D. S, begyndte politifolkene at bruge politistave. De ramte D. S. adskillige gange og belagde ham med håndjern. Klagerne forsøgte at argumentere overfor politifolkene men forgæves. Politifolkene tilkaldte forstærkning og kort efter ankom omkring 10 yderligere politifolk. De slog den første klager med deres politistave flere gange og den anden klager en enkelt gang. Derpå blev D. S. taget med ud til en politibil, hvor han fik slag. Klagerne blev beordret til at stå ved et rækværk. De blev skubbet til og væltet rundt, og politifolkene fornærmede dem med at kalde dem "skod", "ludere" og "bøsser" og "hæslige".

12. Endelig trængte en gruppe politifolk bevæbnet med politistave og med politihunde ind i huset og vækkede de øvrige beboere og beordrede dem til at stille sig op ad væggen. Derpå ransagede politiet huset. Der blev ikke givet oplysning om grundene, formålet og retsgrundlaget for ransagningen. På dette tidspunkt råbte politifolkene ukvemsord mod studenterne. De skubbede og masede dem. Dette stod på omkring en halv time. Derefter forlod politifolkene huset og advarede studenterne om, at nogen af dem begik noget ulovligt, idet de ikke var registrerede med adresse i huset, og de truede dem med, at de ville få problemer, hvis de klagede over episoden.

13. Politiet forlod stedet og tog D. S. med.

14. Den 16. juni 1997 anmode klagerne om at blive undersøgt af en specialist i retsmedicin. Det blev fastslået, at den første klager havde to lange mærker på sin venstre arm, og andre mærker på sin håndflade. Den anden klager havde et blåt mærke på sin balle (13 gange 9 cm.). Det blev noteret, at disse skader kan være fremkommet ved brug af politistave.

2. Som gengivet af regeringen

15. Den anden klager og hendes ven D. S boede i huset med ejerens tilladelse. De modtog ofte besøg af unge fra hele landet. Den omhandlede nat havde den uaflåste bil foran huset forekommet meget mistænkelig. Politifolkene A. C og R. S. troede, at den var stjålen, og overvejede at få den slæbt væk. De havde banket på vinduet, og den anden klager oplyste dem, at ejeren var i huset. Hun havde først klaget over politiforretningen om natten, og havde så gået ind for at kigge efter bilens ejer mellem de 14 unge mennesker, som sov i huset. Klagernes opførsel var aggressiv, de udtalte deres meninger højlydt om formålet og arten af politiforretningen. D. S hævede stemmen overfor politiet og skubbede til A. C.

16. Politiets handling var en følge af den omstændighed, at klagerne ikke  efterkom politiets anmodning om at tilvejebringe de fornødne oplysninger. Klagerne talte til politiet med hævede stemmer og deltog aktivt i slagsmålet med politifolkene.

17. Politifolkene havde mistolket den første klagers hensigter, da han rakte ham sine dokumenter og havde slået  ham for at forhindre at blive angrebet. Klageren blev formentlig slået en gang.

18. Stemningen var spændt. Bilens ejer gav politiet nøglerne og bilens papirer. Idet D. S. var urolig og fortsatte med at udtale sine protester, besluttede politifolkene at anholde ham. Under indtransport slog han en af politifolkene i ansigtet. Derpå blev der anvendt politistave mod ham. Som følge af den holdning, som blev udvist af D. S og de andre tilstedeværende tilkaldte politiet assistance. To andre patruljer og en sikkerhedsstyrke kom til stede. Da klagerne forstyrrede anholdelsen af D. S. blev de slået med politistave.

19. Politibetjentene D. R og J. G. gik derpå ind i huset for at sikre identiteten på de tilstedeværende personer. Derpå blev politiforretningen afsluttet.

B. EMD's vurdering

1. Generelle principper udledt fra EMDs praksis

51. Som EMD har fundet i mange tilfælde, udtrykker artikel 3 i konventionen en af de mest grundlæggende værdier i et demokratisk samfund. Den forbyder i et utvetydigt sprog tortur eller umenneskelig eller nedværdigende behandling eller straf, uden hensyn til omstændighederne og offerets adfærd (se Labita mod Italien (Storkammeret), nr. 2677295, 6. 4. 2000, præmis 119, ECHR 2000-lV).

52. Yderligere skal EMD gentage at efter praksis ved konventionsorganerne skal mishandlingens art overstige en nedre grænse for at falde ind under artikel 3's område (se Irland mod Det forenede kongerige, dom af 18. januar 1978, serie A, nr. 25, side 65, præmis 162). Det samme er gældende med hensyn til tilfælde af nedværdigende behandling (se Costello-Roberts mod Det forenede Kongerige, dom af 25. marts 1993, serie A, nr. 247-C, side 59, præmis 30). Med hensyn til kriterierne vedrørende begrebet "nedværdigende behandling" skal EMD bemærke, at behandlingen i sig selv ikke vil være nedværdigende medmindre den berørte person har været igennem en ydmygelse eller nedværdigelse, der indeholder et minimum af grovhed. Vurderingen af dette minimumsniveau er relativt, det skal vurderes under hensyn til omstændighederne i den konkrete sag (cf., blandt mange afgørelser, Irland mod Det forenede Kongerige citeret ovenfor og Dougoz mod Grækenland, nr. 40907/98, præmis 44).

53. Det skal også gentages, at en behandling kan anses for nedværdigende, hvis, hvis den er således, at den hos offeret fremkalder følelse af frygt, angst og mindreværd, der er i stand til at ydmyge og nedgøre dem (Se Irland mod Det forenede Kongerige gengivet ovenfor, side 66-67, præmis 167). Derudover er det tilstrækkeligt, hvis offeret er ydmyget efter dennes egen opfattelse (Se Tyrer mod Det forenede Kongerige, dom af 25. april 1978, Serie A nr. 26, side 16, præmis 32, og Smith og Grady mod Det forenede Kongerige, numrene 33985/96, 33986/96, præmis 120).

54. Yderligere vil EMD, når det skal vurderes om en behandling er "nedværdigende" i artikel 3's forstand, tage hensyn til, om formålet er at ydmyge og nedgøre den omhandlede person og hvorvidt - for så vidt angår konsekvenserne - de tilsigtet påvirkede hans eller hendes personlighed på en måde, der er uforenelig med artikel 3. Selv fraværet af et sådant formål kan ikke med sikkerhed udelukke, at det statueres, at der er sket en krænkelse af Artikel 3 (se Peers mod Grækenland, nr. 28524/95, præmis 67-68, ECHR 2001-lll, Valasinas mod Lithuania, nr. 44558/98, præmis 101, ECHR 2001-Vlll; og Iwanczuk mod Polen, nr. 25196/94, præmis 52, 15. november 2001).

2. Anvendelsen af ovennævnte principper i den aktuelle sag

55. EMD bemærker, at i den aktuelle sag vækkede politifolkene klagerne midt om natten for at forhøre sig om ejerforholdet til en uaflåst bil parkeret udenfor huset. Den bemærker, at de unge mennesker, som sov i huset, ikke havde opført sig på en måde, som kunne have forstyrret den offentlige orden. Myndighederne henviste ikke til klager fra tredjemand over beboernes opførsel, som kunne have begrundet en så synlig tilstedeværelse af politi.

56. EMD bemærker yderligere, at der kan skelnes mellem to afgrænsede faser i den påfølgende politiforretning.

57. Den første fase bestod af udvekslingerne mellem to politibetjente, klagerne og deres ven D. S. Klagerne og D. S involverede sig i en hed diskussion med politibetjentene. EMD har noteret sig statsadvokatens konstatering af, at de to betjente på dette tidspunkt følte sig truet (se afsnit 23 ovenfor) og anvendte politistave. Denne følelse af at blive truet motiverede også betjentene til at bruge magt mod D. S og til at tilkalde forstærkning.

58. EMD yderligere bemærker, at den anden fase af begivenhederne efter ankomsten af omkring 10 andre politifolk med hunde var kendetegnet af en alvorlig eskalering af atmosfæren. Politibetjentene beordrede som følge deraf alle klagerne ud af huset og lod dem stå op ad væggen iklædt deres nattøj. EMD bemærker, at det var på dette tidspunkt, at betjentene anvendte politistave mod klagerne. Efter EMDs opfattelse er måden, som politiet agerede på på dette stadium i særdeleshed kritisabel. Det har ikke været påvist eller gjort gældende, at klagerne på dette tidspunkt opførte sig på en aggressiv måde, som kunne have begrundet brugen af politistave mod dem. Endvidere er EMD ikke blevet præsenteret for beviser, der viser, at klagerne på dette tidspunkt havde udvist nogen fysisk modstand. Det skal bemærkes, at de unge mennesker herunder klagerne stod overfor en gruppe politifolk, der var særligt uddannet og udstyret til at overvinde fysisk modstand. Selv hvis det lægges til grund, at de i diskussionen med politiet har stillet spørgsmålstegn ved behovet for at vise deres identitetsdokumenter eller udtalte protester med hensyn til formålet med politiforretningen, kan brugen af politistave mod klagerne kun være at anse for uproportionel i forhold til situationen. Det kan ikke udelukkes, at brugen af magt på dette stadium mod klagerne var motiveret af en intention om at straffe nærmere end et reelt behov for at bremse eller modvirke nogen fysisk modstand. 

59. EMD skal gentage, at anvendelsen af fysisk magt mod en person, som ikke er strengt nødvendigt som følge af hans eller hendes egen opførsel mindsker den menneskelige værdighed og er i princippet en krænkelse af retten i Artikel 3. Sådan et strengt proportionalitetssynspunkt er anerkendt af EMD også i tilfælde, hvor et individ allerede er under politiets fulde kontrol (Se for eksempel Klaas mod Tyskland, 22. september 1993, præmis 30, serie A nr. 269, Rehbock mod Slovenien, nr. 29462/95, præmis 68-78, EMD 2000-Xll, Milan mod Frankrig, nr. 7549/03, 24. januar 2008, præmis 68).

60. Endelig bemærker EMD, at regeringen begrænsede sig til at gøre gældende, at indgrebene, der klages over, er lovlige. De betonede, at klagerne ikke havde fulgt politiets anvisninger, og at politifolkene havde mistolket den første klagers intentioner og havde handlet for at undgå, hvad han forstod som et angreb. De forklarede dog ikke, hvilke kriterier der havde været anvendt ved vurderingen af behovet for at bruge et hold politifolk med politihunde og politistave for at efterforske en mindre sag om en uaflåst bil og i mangel på aggressiv adfærd og adfærd, der forstyrrer den offentlige orden, fra klagernes side. Den blotte omstændighed, at bilen var efterladt uaflåst foran huset kan ikke - efter EMDs opfattelse - i sig selv være en rimelig anledning til en hårdhændet politiforretning. 

61. EMD, når henses til omstændighederne vedrørende hændelsen i sin helhed, er af den opfattelse, at klagerne må have oplevet en grundlæggende følelse af sårbarhed, magtesløshed og fornærmelse, som med rimelighed kan beskrives som ydmygende og derfor nedværdigende som dette forstås i artikel 3 i konventionen.

62. Når henses til denne konklusion er EMD yderligere af den opfattelse, at det ikke er nødvendigt under hensyn til de særlige forhold i denne sag at undersøge, hvorvidt de processuelle krav i artikel 3 er overholdt.

63. EMD konkluderer, at der er sket en krænkelse af artikel 3 i konventionen.

ll. PÅSTÅET KRÆNKELSE AF ARTIKEL 8 I KONVENTIONEN

64. Klagerne klagede yderligere over, at deres ret til respekt for deres privatliv og hjem var blevet krænket som følge af, at politifolkene brød ind i deres hus uden ret til at gøre dette.

A. Parternes anbringender

1. Regeringen

65. Regeringen gjorde gældende, at politifolkene ikke havde ransaget huset, men at de kun havde gået derind og bedt personerne derinde om at komme ud.

66. Regeringen henviste til, at klagerne frivilligt havde ladet politifolkene komme ind i huset. De gjorde gældende, at der ikke var beviser for, at der havde været foretaget en ransagning. De gjorde endelig gældende, at hvis klagerne og bilens ejer havde efterkommet politifolkenes anvisning hurtigt, ville der ikke have været noget indgreb.

2. Klagerne

67. Klagerne afviste regeringens anbringender og fastholdt, at politifolkene var gået ind i lejligheden omkring kl. 3 om natten den 14. juni 1997 ved brug af magt og uden deres tilladelse og havde politihunde og politistave med dem. De havde ransaget bygningen og havde ledsaget beboerne ud.

B. EMDs vurdering

1. Generelle principper udledt fra EMDs praksis

68. Artikel 8 i konventionen beskytter individets ret til respekt for sit privatliv og sit familieliv, sit hjem og sin korrespondance. Et hjem vil normalt være stedet, et fysisk afgrænset område, hvor privatliv og familieliv udvikler sig. Et individ har ret til respekt for sit hjem, hvilket indebærer, at en uautoriseret adgang til en persons hjem udgør en krænkelse af denne ret (se til dels Hatton og andre mod Det forenede Kongerige (Storkammeret), nr. 36022/997, præmis 96, EMD-2003-Vlll).

69. EMD har vedvarende fundet, at de kontraherende stater har en vis skønsmargin med hensyn til fastsættelsen for behovet for et indgreb i retten til respekt for ens hjem, men den går hånd i hånd med europæisk kontrol. Undtagelserne, der er hjemmel til i 2. stykke i artikel 8 i konventionen skal tolkes indskrænkende (se Klass og andre mod Tyskland, 6. september 1978, præmis 42, serie A, nr. 28), og behovet for dem i en konkret sag skal være overbevisende.

70. Det er utvivlsomt, at det er af afgørende vigtighed  for kriminalitetsforebyggelsen, at de relevante myndigheder kan agere hurtigt og effektivt. EMD anerkender derfor, at de kontraherende stater kan finde det nødvendigt, at de har redskaber som for eksempel med magt at kunne trænge ind i huse og ransage for at sikre sig beviser og, når dette er relevant, at anholde og strafforfølge forbrydere. Ikke desto mindre skal den relevante lovgivning og praksis  sikre tilstrækkelig og effektiv beskyttelse mod misbrug (se blandt flere afgørelser Cremieux mod Frankrig, 25. februar 1995, nr. 11471/85, præmis 39).

2. Anvendelsen af ovennævnte principper i den aktuelle sag

71. EMD bemærkeer, at fakta med hensyn til adgangen til klagernes hus er omtvistet. Ifølge klagerne trængte en gruppe politibetjente bevæbnet med politistave og politihunde ind i huset og ransagede dette omkring kl. 3 om natten den 14. juni 1997. Regeringen gjorde gældende, at kun to politifolk gik ind i huset. 

72. EMD bemærker dog, at det er ubestridt, at efter at atmosfæren var blevet ophedet og betjentene havde tilkaldt assistance, to politipatruljer og et sikkerhedshold var indblandet i politiforretningen. Når henses til, at politibetjentene var ankommet til klagernes hus midt om natten, er det EMDs opfattelse, at det er rimeligt at lægge til grund, at klagerne havde en meget beskeden valgmulighed bortset fra at tillade politifolkene at komme ind i ejendommen. Det er under disse omstændigheder vanskeligt at følge regeringens henvisning til, at klagerne af egen fri vilje havde givet samtykke. Der er således sket en forstyrrelse af deres ret til respekt for deres hjem. Denne forstyrrelse kan kun tillades, hvis den stemmer overens med de krav, der stilles i artikel 8, § 2, i konventionen. 

73. Med hensyn til dette er EMD opmærksom på det forhold, at de klagende blev mødt med et antal politibetjente, der havde politistave, og som var ledsaget af politihunde, foran døren til deres hus midt om natten. Ingen overbevisende forklaring blev givet fra regeringen på brugen af så synlig magt. Det skal bemærkes, at risikoen for myndighedsmisbrug og krænkelse af menneskelig værdighed er åbenbar i en situation som den, der udviklede sig i den aktuelle sag. Som EMD har betonet i en tilsvarende sag, Kucera mod Slovakiet (nr. 48666/99, dom af 17. juli 2007), skal der træffes forholdsregler for at undgå enhver form for misbrug under sådanne omstændigheder og for at sikre en effektiv beskyttelse af personers rettigheder efter konventionens artikel 8. Sådanne forholdsregler kan være en gennemførelse af regulering, som både omfatter adgangen til ejendomme og foreskriver relevante processuelle garantier, der sikrer for eksempel tilstedeværelsen af en uafhængig person under operationen eller indhentelsen af et klart samtykke fra ejenen som forudsætning for, at politiet skaffer sig adgang til hans eller hendes ejendom.

74. EMD bemærker, at nogle garantier med dette indhold er indsat i artikel 221 i straffeprocesloven og i politiloven. Dog viste disse garantier sig at være ude af stand til at forhindre den situation, der blev klaget over, i den aktuelle sag i at udvikle sig; politiet synes ikke at have anset reglen for at gælde eller være relevant.

75. EMD bemærker yderligere som vist ovenfor, at politiet var kommet til klagernes dør for at spørge dem om den uaflåste bil parkeret uden for huset. Det er allerede fremhævet under artikel 3, at den hårdhændede politiforretning gennemført som led i efterforskningen af ejerforholdet af bilen er ganske uproportionel. Det er EMDs opfattelse, at beslutningen om at gå ind i huset kun kan beskrives som uforholdsmæssig under de omhandlede omstændigheder. 

3. Konklusion

76. Med henvisning til ovennævnte betragtninger finder EMD ikke, at den omhandlede politiforretning var proportionel og forenelig med klagernes ret til respekt for deres hjem .

77. Der er således sket en krænkelse af artikel 8 i konventionen som følge af politifolkenes indtrængen i klagernes hus.

Nedenfor følger en gengivelse af afgørelsen i sin helhed på engelsk:

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF RACHWALSKI AND FERENC v. POLAND

(Application no. 47709/99)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

28 July 2009

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Rachwalski and Ferenc v. Poland,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Nicolas Bratza, President, 
 Lech Garlicki, 
 Giovanni Bonello, 
 Ljiljana Mijović, 
 Ján Šikuta, 
 Mihai Poalelungi, 
 Nebojša Vučinić, judges, 
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 7 July 2009,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 47709/99) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Polish nationals, Mr Piotr Rachwalski and Ms Agata Ferenc (“the applicants”), on 18 October 1998.

2.  The applicants were represented by Mr Adam Bodnar, a lawyer practising in Warsaw. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3.  The applicants alleged, in particular, that they had been deprived of their liberty during an unlawful search of their apartment and that the police had used excessive and unjustified force towards them. They complained of a breach of Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention.

4.  By a decision of 21 October 2008 the Court declared the application partly admissible.

5.  The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1).

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

6.  The applicants were born in born in 1973 and 1976 respectively and live in Wągrowiec.

7.  The parties do not fully agree about the facts of the case, which may be summarised as follows.

1.  As presented by the applicants

8.  The second applicant lived with a group of friends, including the first applicant, mostly students, in an old and decrepit house they had rented in Wrocław. They occasionally invited their friends to spend a night or a couple of days in their house.

9.  On the night of 14 June 1997 there was a group of students sleeping in the house. At 3 a.m. they were awakened by two police officers patrolling the area. The police enquired whether the inhabitants knew the owner of an unlocked car parked in front of the house.

10.  The applicants and one of their friends, D. S., started a polite discussion with the police officers about the car. It was confirmed that one of the residents of their apartment was the owner of the car. However, the police announced their intention of towing the car away to the police car park. The applicants argued that it was not forbidden or illegal to keep the car unlocked. At the police's request, they produced their identity cards and the registration card of the car, whose owner was asleep in the house.

11.  The police were not satisfied with their explanation and the dispute became more intense. In reaction to the opinions expressed about the intervention, in particular by D. S., the policemen used truncheons. They hit D. S. several times and handcuffed him. The applicants tried to argue with the policemen, to no avail. The police called other police officers and shortly afterwards approximately ten other policemen arrived. They hit the first applicant with their truncheons several times and the second applicant once. Thereupon D. S. was taken to the police car where he was beaten. The applicants were ordered to stand against a fence. They were pushed and jostled and the policemen insulted them referring to them as “scum”, “slobs”, “queers” (hołota, brudasy, pedały).

12.  Subsequently, a group of policemen, armed with truncheons and guarded by police dogs, entered the house, woke up the other occupants and ordered them to stand against the wall. Then the police searched the house. No information was provided about the grounds, purpose or legal basis for the search. During this time the police showered abuse on the students. They pushed and shoved them. This lasted for about half an hour. Afterwards, the police left the house and warned the students that some of them were in an illegal situation as they were not registered as inhabitants of the house, and threatened that they would be in trouble if they submitted a complaint about the events.

13.  The police left, taking D. S. with them.

14.  On 16 June 1997 the applicants requested to be examined by a forensic medicine specialist. It was established that the first applicant had two long bruises on his left arm, and other bruises on the palm of his hand. The second applicant had a blue mark on her bottom (13 by 9 cm). It was stated that these bruises could have been caused by the use of police truncheons.

2.  As presented by the Government

15.  The second applicant and her friend D. S. lived in the house with the owner's permission. They often received young visitors from all over the country. On the night in question the unlocked car parked in front of the house had seemed very suspicious to the policemen A. C. and R. S., who thought it was stolen and considered that it should be towed away. They had knocked at the window and the second applicant informed them that the owner was in the house. She first objected to the police action at night, and then went to look for the owner of the car among the fourteen young people who were sleeping in the house. The applicants behaved aggressively, loudly expressing opinions about the purpose and nature of the intervention. D. S. raised his voice to the police and pushed A. C.

16.  The police action was a result of the fact that the applicants did not comply with the police requests to provide necessary information. The applicants talked to the police with raised voices and took a very active part in the struggle with the policemen.

17.  The police officer had misinterpreted the first applicant's intentions when he handed him his documents and had hit him to prevent his being attacked. The applicant was most probably hit once.

18.  The atmosphere was tense. The owner of the car gave the police the keys and documents to the car. As D. S. was unruly and continued to express objections, the policemen decided to arrest him. While he was being taken into custody by the police, he hit one of them in the face. Thereupon truncheons were used against him. Given the attitude of D. S. and of other persons present, the police called for assistance. Two other police patrols and an emergency team arrived. As the applicants were interfering with the arrest of D. S., they were hit with truncheons.

19.  Police officers D. R. and J. G. then entered the house to check the identity of the persons present. After that, the intervention was terminated.

3.  The prosecutor's investigation and conclusion

20.  On 16 June 1997 the applicants requested the Wrocław District Prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against the police for abuse of authority. On 23 December 1997 the prosecutor refused to do so. He found that no criminal offence had been committed.

21.  The prosecutor considered that the police action had been justified. The police could have reasonably suspected that the unlocked car had been stolen, even though it had not been reported as such. The further developments had certainly come as a surprise to both the police and other persons involved in the incident. The second applicant had objected in a pretentious tone (“pretensjonalny ton głosu”) to having been woken up and to the check on the car taking place at night. She had been informed that the car would be towed away if the owner was not found. She could not locate the owner of the car, as there were many people in the house who did not know each other. The second applicant had woken all of them up in an attempt to find the owner.

22.  D. S. had objected in a loud voice to the police intervention. He had insisted that the intention of the police was to harass the persons in the house. As he had not obeyed the police requests to calm down and the verbal exchange between him and the police officer A. C. had become increasingly heated, it had been decided that he should be taken to the police car. The prosecutor considered that this had been justified in the light of D. S.'s aggressive behaviour. Given that D. S. had been behaving aggressively, direct force had been used against him, including the use of truncheons and handcuffs. It was true that the applicants' versions of the facts diverged, and these divergences could not be clarified on the basis of evidence from other witnesses, but it was clear that, in the face of his resistance, it had been necessary to use such force in order to take D. S. to the car.

23.  Given the applicants' behaviour, the police had had to call assistance. They had also felt threatened by the presence of other persons at the scene of the incident. The applicants had been hit as they had ignored the order to let D. S. go so that he could be taken to the car. In the darkness, the police had not noticed that the first applicant had in fact had his documents in his hand in order to show them to the police, and they had thought that he intended to hit them.

24.  It was finally noted that the accounts of the facts given by the persons present at the scene, other than the police, were highly divergent, making it impossible to establish the facts of the case. However, the testimony given by the policemen was coherent. Therefore, the submissions of the other persons could not be considered credible and had to be assessed critically.

25.  The prosecutor concluded that the measures taken by the police had been proportionate to the situation.

4.  The appeal against the prosecutor's decision

26.  The first applicant appealed. He argued that the police brutality and aggression had been totally unjustified. Nothing in the behaviour of the persons present had justified the use of force. The police had entered private property and effected a search of the house without any sound reasons, hitting and insulting the persons sleeping in the house. He argued that he was a law-abiding citizen, a student of two university faculties and a member of the Municipal Council of his town. He had not given any reason to be beaten, verbally insulted and humiliated just at the whim of the police. The police should not intervene in private property at night and hit, insult and humiliate people just because they looked, or lived, differently. The facts as established by the prosecutor did not correspond to what had happened. All the facts had been established on the basis of the arguments of the police, who had apparently been instructed by police lawyers as to what they should say. During the questioning the prosecutor had made unpleasant remarks about the hairstyles, clothes and views of the young inhabitants of the house, which had influenced her decision to discontinue the proceedings. He submitted that the police had humiliated both himself and the others.

27.  The second applicant submitted that the assessment of the evidence had been biased and that the police had clearly abused their authority, insulting and humiliating her and other participants in the incident.

5.  The outcome of the appeal

28.  On 20 May 1998 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor upheld the contested decision. He considered that the intervention of the police had been justified in so far as they wanted to verify the identity of the owner of the car. D. S. had behaved aggressively, both verbally and physically. Regardless of whether he had intended to hit A. C. in the face or not, his behaviour could have been perceived as an intentional assault. It was for that reason that a decision to arrest him had been taken. The identity check of the persons present in the house had been necessary as they had insulted the policemen.

29.  The social status of the young people, namely the fact that they were students, imposed certain obligations on them, in particular an obligation to cooperate with the police in the interest of law and order.

30.  The findings of the inquiry had not established that the students had been insulted verbally by the police, as the policemen consistently denied this. Nothing had been found to support the first applicant's submission that the testimony of the policemen had been suggested to them by the police lawyers.

31.  The prosecutor concluded that the contested decision had to be upheld.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

32.  The Code of Criminal Procedure contains the following provisions on the search of premises by the police:

Article 221

§ 1 Searches of inhabited premises can be made during the night only in cases when it is indispensable to carry out such searches without delay. Night-time lasts from 10 p.m. until 6 a.m.

§ 2 A search which has commenced during the day can be continued during the night.

§ 3 Only premises which are accessible at this time to a particular person or persons, or premises designed for storage, can be searched at night.

33.  The police's powers regarding the use of coercive measures is regulated by the Police Act of 6 April 1990 and by the Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 17 September 1990 setting out the conditions and method of application of coercive measures.

34.  Pursuant to section 14 of the Police Corps Act, within the limits of their competence, the police are required – in order to examine, prevent and detect offences and petty offences – to carry out operational and reconnaissance activity, take part in an investigation or inquiry, or carry out administrative activity and safeguard public order. In the exercise of their powers the police must respect human dignity and human rights (section 3).

35.  Section 16 of the Police Corps Act provides that if a person does not comply with the lawful request of police officers they may apply such coercive measures as, for instance, using truncheons.

36.  The police are bound by the principle of minimal use of coercive measures. In accordance with this principle the police must only use such measures when they are absolutely necessary in the given circumstances in order to enforce execution of orders issued by the police (section 16 § 2).

37.  The ordinance setting out the conditions, circumstances and method of application of coercive measures by the police, issued on the basis of section 16 § 4 of the Police Corps Act (Ordinance of the Council of Ministers of 17 September 1990 on the Use of Coercive Measures by the Police), indicates – among other coercive measures – the use of truncheons.

Section 5 of the (“the 1990 Ordinance”) provides:

“1.  Physical force shall be used in order to restrain a person, to counter an attack or to make [a person] obey an order.

2.  When using physical force, no one shall hit a person, unless he has to do so in self-defence or in order to counter an unlawful attack against life, health or property of others. ”

Section 13 of the Ordinance, in so far as relevant, provided at the material time:

“2.  It is forbidden to use police truncheons against persons displaying passive resistance unless the use of force turns out to be ineffective.

3 (1) It is forbidden to hit or push with a truncheon against a [person's] head, neck, stomach and non-muscled and particularly delicate parts of the body...”

38.  Pursuant to section 142 § 1 of the Police Corps Act a police officer who in the performance of official duties oversteps his powers and violates the personal interests and dignity of a citizen, is liable to imprisonment for up to five years.

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

39.  The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the police conduct towards them had amounted to degrading treatment.

Article 3 of the Convention reads:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

A.  The parties' submissions

1.  The applicants

40.  The applicants argued that the police action had constituted a penalty for their unconventional lifestyle. In their opinion the policemen had intended to humiliate and harass them and had acted with a sense of impunity.

41.  The applicants further submitted that they and their friends had on several occasions been harassed by police officers who apparently did not like their appearance. In view of the fact that it had never been established that they had done anything against the law, the applicants argued that the insults directed at them during the incident had manifestly indicated prejudice on the part of the police officers against them.

42.  The applicants argued that the use of truncheons against them had been unjustified and excessive. Hitting one of the applicants, a young woman, had been humiliating and punitive. They disputed the Government's argument that their behaviour had been aggressive and that one of the applicants had been hit only once by the policemen.

43.  The applicants submitted that they had been insulted, assaulted and humiliated by having been expelled from the house by the policemen using truncheons and police dogs and placed against the wall in their pyjamas. They argued that the investigation had been opened only after they had made repeated requests and following press releases concerning the incident. The applicants also questioned the impartiality and objectivity of the prosecuting authorities in the conduct of the investigation.

2.  The Government

44.  The Government argued that the applicants had not been subjected to degrading treatment and that the police had made a legitimate intervention in the applicants' case, showing due diligence when performing their official duties.

45.  The Government submitted that the applicants had disturbed the legitimate police action aimed at arresting one of the students, who had assaulted a policeman and had actively resisted the attempt to arrest him. The Government further stressed that the police officer had misinterpreted the first applicant's intentions when he held out his documents and had hit him to prevent a perceived attack. In the Government's opinion, the applicant was most probably hit once.

46.  According to the Government's further submissions, the applicants did not comply with the police requests. The situation was very tense and the applicants had talked to the police with raised voices and taken a very active part in the struggle with the policemen. However, the policemen had never intended to arrest the applicants.

47.  The Government emphasised that the police intervention had been necessary. The applicants had behaved aggressively and had refused to obey police orders. The use of direct force against them had therefore been indispensable and proportionate.

48.  In the Government's view, the level of suffering and humiliation in the applicants' case did not reach the threshold that would justify the applicability of Article 3 of the Convention.

49.  With respect to the procedural aspect of the case, the Government argued that the investigation had complied with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. In order to collect more evidence the prosecutor had twice decided to extend the investigation. Twenty-eight witnesses to the incident were interviewed and some of them confronted. In the Government's view the investigation conducted by the public prosecutor had been effective.

50.  The Government also submitted that the applicants could have brought private prosecutions against the police officers once the investigation automatically conducted under section 142 of the Police Corps Act had been discontinued.  

B.  The Court's assessment

1.  General principles deriving from the Court's case-law

51. As the Court has held on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim's behaviour (see Labita v  Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, 6.4.2000, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV).

52.  The Court further recalls that, according to the Convention organs' case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, § 162). The same holds true in so far as degrading treatment is concerned (see Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1993, Series A no. 247-C, p. 59, § 30). As for the criteria concerning the notion of “degrading treatment”, the Court notes that the treatment itself will not be degrading unless the person concerned has undergone humiliation or debasement attaining a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it has to be assessed with regard to the circumstances of any given case (cf., among many authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, and Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 44).

53.  It is also recalled that treatment may be considered degrading if it is such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, pp. 66-67, § 167). Moreover, it is sufficient if the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes (see Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26, p. 16, § 32, and Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 ; 33986/96, § 120).

54.  Furthermore, in considering whether a treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3. Even the absence of such a purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see Peers v. Greece, no. 28524/95, §§ 67-68, ECHR 2001-III; Valašinas v. Lithuania, no. 44558/98, § 101, ECHR 2001-VIII; and Iwańczuk v. Poland, no. 25196/94, § 52, 15 November 2001).

2.  Application of the above principles to the present case

55.  The Court notes that in the present case police officers woke up the applicants in the middle of the night to inquire about the ownership of an unlocked car parked outside the house. It observes that the young people who were sleeping in the house had not behaved in any manner that could have disturbed the public order. The authorities did not refer to any complaints by third parties about the conduct of the occupants which might have triggered such a visible police presence.

56.  The Court further notes that two distinct phases can be distinguished in the subsequent police intervention.

57.  The first phase consisted in the exchange between two police officers, the applicants and their friend D.S. The applicants and D.S. engaged in a heated discussion with the police officers.  The Court notes the District Prosecutor's finding that at this stage the two officers felt threatened (see paragraph 23 above) and used truncheons. This sense of threat also prompted the officers to use force against D.S. and to call for reinforcements.

58.  The Court further notes that the second phase of events, after the arrival of approximately ten other police officers with dogs, was marked by a serious escalation in tension. The police officers subsequently ordered all the applicants out of the house and stood them against a wall, dressed in their night clothes. The Court notes that it was at that moment that the police officers used truncheons against the applicants. In the Court's opinion, the manner of intervention of the police at that stage is particularly open to criticism. It has not been shown or argued that the applicants at that time had behaved in an aggressive manner which would have warranted the use of truncheons against them. Nor has the Court been presented with any evidence to show that at that juncture the applicants had offered any physical resistance. It must be noted that the young people, including the applicants, were at that time confronted by a group of police officers, specially trained and equipped to overcome physical resistance. Even assuming that when remonstrating with the police they questioned the need to show their identity documents or expressed objections as to the purpose of the intervention, the use of truncheons against the applicants can only be considered disproportionate to the situation. It cannot be ruled out that at that stage the use of force against the applicants was motivated rather by punitive intentions than by any genuine need to break or discourage any physical opposition.

59.  The Court reiterates that recourse to physical force against a person  which  has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3. Such a strict proportionality approach has been accepted by the Court also in respect of a situation where an individual is already under the full control of the police (see, among others, Klaas v. Germany, 22 September 1993, § 30, Series A no. 269; Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462/95, §§ 68-78, ECHR 2000-XII; Milan c. France, no.7549/03, 24 January 2008, § 68).

60.  Lastly, the Court observes that in their submissions the Government confined themselves to pointing to the lawfulness of the measures complained of. They emphasised that the applicants had not complied with the police requests and that the police officers has misinterpreted the first applicant's intentions and had acted in order to prevent a perceived attack. However, they did not explain what criteria had been used to assess the necessity of the use of a police team with guard dogs and truncheons to investigate a minor issue of an unlocked car and in the absence of any aggression or behaviour disturbing the public order on the part of the applicants. The mere fact that the car was left unlocked in front of the house cannot, in the Court's view, in itself constitute a good reason for a heavy-handed police intervention.

61.  The Court, taking into account the circumstances of the incident as a whole, is of the opinion that the applicants must have experienced a profound sense of vulnerability, powerlessness and affront which can reasonably be described as humiliating and therefore degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.

62.  Having regard to this finding, the Court is further of the view that it is not necessary in the particular circumstances of this case to examine whether the procedural requirements under Article 3 have been complied with.

63.  The Court concludes that there has been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION

64.  The applicants further complained that their right to respect for their private life and home had been breached as the police officers had broken into the house without any legal right to do so.

Article 8 of the Convention reads:

“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life, his home ....

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

A.  The parties' submissions

1.  The Government

65.  The Government submitted that the police had not searched the house but had only entered it and requested the persons inside to leave.

66.  The Government argued that the applicants had voluntarily let the police officers enter the house. They submitted that there was no proof that a search of the house had taken place. They further argued that if the applicants and the car's owner had complied quickly with the police officers' request, there would have been no intervention.

2.  The applicants

67.  The applicants rejected the Government's submissions and maintained that the police officers had entered the flat at about 3 a.m. on 14 June 1997 by force without their consent and had police dogs and truncheons with them. They had searched the premises and escorted the occupants out.

B.  The Court's assessment

1.  General principles deriving from the Court's case-law

68.  Article 8 of the Convention protects the individual's right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. A home will usually be the place, the physically defined area, where private and family life develops. The individual has a right to respect for his home, meaning that an unauthorised entry into a person's home would constitute a breach of that right (see, mutatis mutandis, Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 96, ECHR 2003-VIII).

69.  The Court has consistently held that Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the need for an interference with the right to respect for one's home, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision. The exceptions provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention are to be interpreted narrowly (see Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, § 42, Series A no. 28), and the need for them in a given case must be convincingly established.

70.  Undoubtedly, in the prevention of crime it is of key importance that the relevant authorities can act promptly and efficiently. The Court therefore recognises that Contracting States may consider it necessary to have recourse to measures such as forcible entry onto premises and house searches in order to obtain evidence and, where appropriate, to apprehend and prosecute offenders. Nonetheless, the relevant legislation and practice must afford adequate and effective safeguards against abuse (see, among other authorities, Crémieux v. France, 25 February 1995, no. 11471/85, § 39).

2.  Application of the above principles to the present case

71.  The Court notes that the facts concerning the entry into the applicants' house are disputed by the parties. According to the applicants, a group of police officers, armed with truncheons and guarded by police dogs, entered and searched their apartment at about 3 a.m. on 14 June 1997. The Government argued that only two police officers had entered the house.

72.  The Court observes, however, that it is undisputed that, after the atmosphere had become tense and the officers called for assistance, two police patrols and an emergency team were involved in the intervention. In the Court's opinion, considering that the police officers had come to the applicants' house at night, it can reasonably be concluded that the applicants were left with little choice but to allow the police to enter the premises. It is difficult to accept the Government's argument that, in the circumstances, any consent given by the applicants was free. There has accordingly been an interference with their right to respect for their home. That interference will only be justified if it complies with the requirements set out in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.

73.  In that respect, the Court has regard to the fact that the applicants were confronted by a number of police officers carrying truncheons and accompanied by dogs at the front door of their house in the middle of the night. No compelling justification was given by the Government for the use of such visible force. It must be observed that a risk of abuse of authority and violation of human dignity is inherent in a situation such as the one which arose in the present case. As the Court stressed in a similar case, Kučera v. Slovakia (no. 48666/99, judgment of 17 July 2007), safeguards should be in place in order to avoid any possible abuse in such circumstances and to ensure the effective protection of a person's rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Such safeguards might include the adoption of regulatory measures which both confine the entering of premises and prescribe relevant procedural guarantees ensuring, for example, the presence of an impartial person during the operation or the obtaining of the owner's clear consent as a pre-condition to entering his or her premises.

74.  The Court observes that certain guarantees to that effect are incorporated in Article 221 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the Police Corps Act. However, those guarantees failed to prevent the situation complained of in the instant case from occurring; the police did not seem to regard them as applicable or relevant.

75.  The Court further notes that, as indicated above, the police had come to the applicants' door in order to ask them about an unlocked car parked outside the house. It has already highlighted under Article 3 the total lack of justification for the police's heavy-handed approach to the investigation into the ownership of the car. For the Court, the decision to enter the premises can only be described as disproportionate in the circumstances.

3.  Conclusion

76.  In view of the above considerations, the Court is not satisfied that the action in issue was proportionate and compatible with the applicants' right to respect for their home.

77.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention as a result of the entry by the police into the applicants' house.

III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION

78.  The applicants also complained that the conduct of the police officers had infringed their right to liberty and security guaranteed by Article 5 of the Convention.

Article 5 § 1 of the Convention reads, in so far as relevant:

“1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;”

79.  Bearing in mind its finding of a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether the facts alleged also constituted deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5.

IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

80.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

81.  The applicants sought 4,000 euros (EUR) each in compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage they had suffered on account of the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention and EUR 4,000 each on account of the alleged violation of Article 8.

82.  The Court accepts that the applicants suffered non-pecuniary damage and, making its assessment on an equitable basis, awards each of the applicants EUR 2,000 under this head.

B.  Default interest

83.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;

2.      Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;

3.      Holds that it is not necessary to examine separately the applicants' complaint under Article 5 of the Convention;

4.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay each of the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Polish zlotys at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

5.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 July 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza 
 Registrar President

RACHWALSKI AND FERENC v. POLAND JUDGMENT

RACHWALSKI AND FERENC v. POLAND JUDGMENT