Afvisning af appelsag som følge af at klageren udeblev fra
hovedforhandlingen trods lovlig forkyndelse var i strid med EMRK artikel 6

I afgørelsens præmis 34 udtaler EMD blandt andet, at det var appelretten i Helsingfors' pligt at tillade klagerens advokat, som deltog i retsmødet, at forsvare klageren, selv om klageren var fraværende fra retsmødet. EMD fremhæver i præmis 32, at retten for enhver, der er sigtet for en kriminel handling, til at blive forsvaret effektivt af en advokat, er en af de grundlæggende elementer i en retfærdig rettergang. En tiltalt mister ikke denne ret blot ved ikke at møde frem til et retsmøde. EMD tilføjer i præmis 32, at medlemsstaterne har en legitim ret til at sanktionere udeblivelse fra retsmøder, men at dette skal ske med andre midler end fratage tiltalte sin ret til et forsvar.

Det fremgår således af afgørelsen, at en ankesag ikke bør afvises, blot fordi tiltalte udebliver under behandlingen af ankesagen, såfremt tiltalte er repræsenteret ved en forsvarer, der har givet møde.

Af retsplejelovens § 920, stk. 2 og stk. 3, om ankesager fremgår følgende:

I straffesagen U.2006.1924Ø afsagde Østre Landsret kendelse om, at tiltaltes anke skulle afvises, idet den lægeerklæring, der var fremlagt ved retsmødets begyndelse, efter landsrettens opfattelse ikke var tilstrækkelig dokumentation for tiltaltes sygdom. Det fremgår udtrykkeligt af kendelsen, at den beskikkede forsvarer gav møde. Kendelsen om afvisning blev truffet i det samme retsmøde.

I straffesagen U.2008.2620H afsagde Højesteret kendelse om, at det var korrekt, at landsretten havde afvist en ankesag, hvor tiltalte havde anket byrettens dom af ubetinget fængsel i 4 måneder, og hvor der var sket konfiskation af en bil. Det fremgår af sagen, at forsvareren var til stede, og at denne ved retsmødets indledning oplyste retten om, at tiltalte var på vej til retsmødet, og at han ville blive cirka 40 minutter forsinket. Det fremgår også af sagen, at landsretten havde tid til at behandle sagen trods forsinkelsen, idet den ankesag, der skulle være behandlet efter retsmødet, var blevet hævet.

I begge overnævnte kendelser var forsvareren til stede. I ingen af tilfældene fik tiltaltes forsvarer lov til at forsvare tiltalte, selv om forsvareren var til stede. Denne praksis synes utvivlsomt at stride mod den praksis, som findes ved EMD, og som blandt andet er kommet til udtryk i afgørelsen Kari-Pekka Pietiläinen mod Finland.

Umiddelbart nedenfor gengives uddrag af  Kari-Pekka Pietiläinen mod Finland oversat til dansk. Derefter følger afgørelsen uforkortet og på originalsprog. 
 

l Sagens faktiske omstændigheder

5. Klageren er født i 1967 og bor i Helsinki.

6. Den 24. februar 2004 blev klageren straffet for groft bedrageri ved Tuusula distriksret og idømt en betinget fængselsstraf af fængsel i et år og 8 måneder.

7. Den 25. marts 2004 ankede klageren til Helsinkis appelret og gjorde blandt andet gældende, at han begærede en mundtlig forhandling. De medtiltalte og en af de forurettede appellerede også til appelretten.

8. 28. december 2004, efter at have modtaget skriftlige iagttagelser fra parterne, besluttede appelretten at holde en mundtlig hovedforhandling. 29. december 2004 blev det forkyndt for parterne, at de skulle møde frem til den mundtlige hovedforhandling, som var berammet til 28. februar, 14. og 16. marts, 18. marts, og 21. og 24. marts 2005. Det fremgik af afgørelsen og af forkyndelsen, at klageren skulle give møde personligt til hovedforhandlingen på alle disse dage, og at udeblivelse kunne føre til bødestraf. Hans tilstedeværelse var nødvendig både som følge af hans egen appel og som følge af de øvrige parters. Derudover skulle han afhøres af anklagemyndigheden. Dog skulle vidnerne afhøres mellem den 14. og den 24. marts 2005. Derudover fremgik det af forkyndelsen, at hvis klageren var fraværende fra hovedforhandlingen uden en gyldig grund og på trods af muligheden for bødestraf, ville behandlingen af hans appelsag blive afvist. For så vidt angår de øvriges appelsag samt anklagemyndighedens appelsag kunne han risikere en ny og højere bøde, og at blive hentet og fremstillet for mødet eller et senere møde. Sagen kunne blive afgjort i hans fravær. En gyldig grund ville sige force majeure eller sygdom ifølge lægeerklæring. Arbejde eller ferie ville normalt ikke blive anset for gyldige grunde. Appeldomstolen ville foretage en prøvelse af, om grundene var gyldige.  

9. Retsmødet blev forkyndt for klageren den 4. januar 2005.

10. Klageren gav ikke møde ved hovedforhandlingen den 28. februar 2005 men var repræsenteret ved sin forsvarer. Det var ikke muligt at få kontakt med ham via telefon på trods af adskillige forsøg. Anklageren begærede klageren anholdt, men dette blev ikke sat i værk. Forsvareren gjorde gældende, at klageren højst sandsynligt kunne træffes på sin bopæl, men at hans tilstedeværelse ved mødet den 28. februar 2005 ikke var nødvendigt, idet det forudgående var planlagt, at klageren kun skulle afhøres den 15. marts 2005.

11. Den 28. februar 2005 besluttede appelretten med henvisning til kapitel 26, paragraf 20, punkt 1 i retsplejeloven, at klagerens appelsag skulle afvises som følge af dennes udeblivelse. Den fandt, at siden klageren ikke var mødt frem til retsmødet den 28. februar 2005 eller givet meddelelse til retten om en gyldig grund til sit fravær, kunne han anses for at være fraværende, uagtet at hans forsvarer gav møde. Det blev udtalt i afgørelsen, at en almindelig appel ikke kunne tillades, men at hvis klageren havde en gyldig grund, som han ikke havde været i stand til at meddele i tide, havde han ret til at få sagen genåbnet på grundlag af den samme anke ved at meddele appelretten dette inden for en frist af 30 dage fra datoen, hvor det var besluttet at afvise anken. Hvis han ikke kunne fremkomme med en gyldig grund ville sagen blive afvist.

12. Den 15. marts 2005 deltog klageren i hovedforhandlingen som planlagt og blev afhørt som vidne.

13. Den 24. marts 2005 meddelte klageren skriftligt til appelretten, at han havde en gyldig begrundelse for sit fravær, og at han ønskede sagen genåbnet. Han gjorde gældende, at den omhandlede nationale bestemmelse i kapitel 26, paragraf 20, punkt 1, i retsplejeloven var blevet fortolket for restriktivt. Han henviste til en afgørelse fra højesteret, hvoraf det fremgik, at den omhandlede bestemmelse ikke skulle tolkes for restriktivt. Hvis klageren var fraværende fra hovedforhandlingen, og hvis hans tilstedeværelse ikke ansås for strengt nødvendig, burde hans anke ikke afvises med henvisning til hans fravær.

14. Endvidere gjorde klageren gældende, at ovennævnte bestemmelse formentlig ikke opfyldte kravene i Den europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention. Da bestemmelsen sidst var blevet ændret, havde regeringen foreslået nogle ændringer i teksten for at få den til at stemme bedre overens med EMDs praksis på området. Disse ændringer var dog ikke blevet vedtaget af parlamentet.

15. Derudover gjorde klageren gældende, at når det ikke var reguleret i national ret, hvorledes fremgangsmåden var, når sagen varede i flere dage, burde man have valgt en konventions-venlig fortolkning. Appeldomstolen havde udarbejdet en tidsplan ifølge hvilken, klageren personligt kun skulle afhøres den 15. marts 2005. Det var ikke præciseret i forkyndelsen, at udeblivelse på en enkelt dag ville blive anset som udeblivelse fra hele hovedforhandlingen. Klagerens tilstedeværelse den 28. februar 2005 var således ikke strengt nødvendig og ankeinstansen burde ikke have afvist anken. Klageren havde ikke tænkt sig at
tilbagekalde sin anke.

16. Under alle omstændigheder gjorde klageren gældende, at han havde en gyldig grund, idet han havde været syg. Han fremlagde en lægeerklæring og to dokumenter af lægelig art til støtte for dette.

17. Den 21. juni 2005 afviste ankeinstansen klagerens anmodning. Den lagde vægt på, at lægeerklæringen var dateret 8 dage efter retsmødet, og at lægen ikke havde undersøgt klageren den 28. februar 2005. På denne dag havde klageren ikke modtaget behandling på et hospital eller tilsvarende institution i sundhedssektoren. Klageren led af langvarig sygdom og hans behandling forventedes at skulle pågå i de næste 2 til 3 år. Til trods for klagerens helbredstilstand ville han havde været i stand til at give møde den 15. marts 2005. Hans sygdom var såedes ikke af en art, der kunne udgøre en gyldig grund til fravær. Klageren havde rigelig tid til at forberede sig i god tid inden retssagen og også mulighed for at tage hensyn til retssagen, når han tilrettelagde sine behandlinger. Således havde klageren ikke demonstreret, at han havde en gyldig grund til at udeblive fra retsmødet den 28. februar 2005, og han havde ikke krav på at få sagen
genoptaget.

18. Den 18. august 2005 ankede klageren til Højesteret, hvor han gentog de appelgrunde, som han havde gjort gældende ved appeldomstolen, og han henviste til, at appelretten ikke havde forholdt sig til hans anbringender med hensyn til national ret eller EMDs praksis.

19. 11. oktober 2005 afviste højesteret at tillade anke.
 

31. EMD skal fremhæve, at det er af væsentlig betydning, at en tiltalt skal møde frem, både på grund af dennes ret til en retssag og på grund af behovet for at få efterprøvet nøjagtigheden af dennes forklaringer og for at kunne sammenligne disse med forurettedes og vidnernes, hvis interesser skal beskyttes. Lovgivningsmagten må i overensstemmelse hermed have mulighed for at modvirke urimeligt fravær (se Poitrimol mod Frankrig, 23. november 1993, præmis 35, serie A, nr. 277-A). Dog er det også af afgørende betydning for retfærdigheden i straffeprocessen, at den tiltalte har et tilstrækkeligt forsvar både i første instans og i appelinstansen (se Lala mod Holland, 22. september 1994, præmis 33, serie A nr. 297-A, og Pelladoah mod Holland, 22. september 1994, præmis 40, serie A nr. 297 B). Den sidstnævnte interesse er af den væsentligste betydning, og som følge deraf kan den omstændighed, at en tiltalt til trods for, at sagen er forkyndt korrekt for denne, udebliver uden gyldig grund, ikke føre til, at han fratages sine rettigheder efter artikel 6, præmis 3, i konventionen om at være repræsenteret af en forsvarer (se Lala mod Holland, citeret ovenfor, præmis 33, og Pelladoah mod Holland, citeret ovenfor, præmis 40). Det er domstolenes pligt at påse, at rettergangen er retfærdig, og således at den advokat, der giver møde med det åbenbare formål at forsvare tiltalte i dennes fravær, får muligheden for dette (se Lala mod Holland, citeret ovenfor, præmis 34, og Pelladoah mod Holland, citeret ovenfor, præmis 41).  

32. Retten for enhver, der er sigtet for en kriminel handling, til at blive forsvaret effektivt af en advokat, er en af de grundlæggende elementer i en retfærdig rettergang. En tiltalt mister ikke denne ret blot ved ikke at møde frem til et retsmøde. Selv om lovgivningsmagten skal have adgang til at modvirke urimeligt fravær, har den ikke adgang til at reagere ved at indføre undtagelser i forhold til retten til juridisk bistand. Det legitime krav, at tiltalte skal deltage i retsmøderne, kan opnås med andre midler end fratagelse af retten til et forsvar (Se Van Geuseghem mod Belgien [Storkammeret], nr. 26103/95, præmis 34, ECHR 1999-1).

33. Derudover skal EMD gentage, at retten til retfærdig rettergang garanteret under artikel 6, § 1, i konventionen, blandt andet omfatter parternes ret til under forhandlingerne at præsentere de synspunkter, som de finder af betydning for sagen. Konventionen tilstræber at garantere ikke teoretiske eller illusoriske rettigheder men effektive og praksiske rettigheder (se Artico mod Italien, 13. maj 1980, præmis 33, serie A, nr. 37). Denne ret kan kun anses for effektiv, hvis klageren faktisk bliver "hørt", det vil sige, at hans synspunkter bliver grundigt undersøgt af domstolene. Artikel 6, § 1, i konventionen pålægger domstolene pligt til blandt andet grundigt at undersøge de påstande, argumenter og beviser, der fremføres af parterne uden at det på forhånd er udelukket, at det fremførte er relevant for domstolenes afgørelse (Se Van de Hurk mod Holland, 19. april 1994, § 59, Serie A nr. 288; Dulaurans mod Frankrig, nr. 34553/97, § 33, 21. marts 2000; og Virgil Ionescu mod Romanien, nr. 53037/99, præmis 44, 28. juni 2005; i relation til retten til adgang til en domstol se Perez mod Frankrig [Storkammeret], nr. 47287/99, præmis 80, ECHR 2004-l, og Albina mod Romanien, nr. 57808/00, præmis 30, 28. april 2005; og med hensyn til klagerens ret til en fornyet prøvelse af dennes domfældelse se Nedzela mod Frankrig, nr. 73695/01, præmisserne 55-56, 27. juli 2006).

34. Principperne, der er fastslået i de ovennævnte sager, gælder i den aktuelle sag. Det var appelretten i Helsingfors' pligt at tillade klagerens advokat, som deltog i retsmødet, at forsvare ham, selv om han var fraværende. Dette var i særdeleshed tilfælde i den aktuelle sag, hvor appelretten havde udfærdiget en tidsplan, ifølge hvilken vidnerne skulle afhøres fra 14. marts 2005 og fremefter. Uagtet at det planlagte omfang af retsmødet den 28. februar 2005 ikke er ganske klart, indeholdt det tilsyneladende ikke punkter, der strengt nødvendiggjorde klagerens tilstedeværelse. Dertil kommer, at sagen skulle vare flere dage, og at det ikke fremgik af forkyndelsen, at blot en enkelt dags fravær ville være at anse som udeblivelse fra hele sagen. Under disse omstændigheder var afvisningen af klagerens sag, til trods for at klagerens advokat var til stede den 28. februar 2005, en særdeles rigid og streng straf for dennes fravær, som ikke kan betragtes som rimelig, når henses til forsvarets rettigheder og kravene til en retfærdig rettergang.

35. Konklusionen er, at der er sket en krænkelse af konventionens artikel 6, § 1, sammenholdt med artikel 6, § 3 (c).
 

FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF KARI-PEKKA PIETILÄINEN v. FINLAND

(Application no. 13566/06)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

22 September 2009

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Kari-Pekka Pietiläinen v. Finland,

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Nicolas Bratza, President, 
 Giovanni Bonello, 
 David Thór Björgvinsson, 
 Ján Šikuta, 
 Päivi Hirvelä, 
 Ledi Bianku, 
 Nebojša Vučinić, judges, 
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 1 September 2009,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 13566/06) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Finnish national, Mr Kari-Pekka Pietiläinen (“the applicant”), on 10 April 2006.

2.  The applicant was represented by Mr Ari Halonen, a lawyer practising in Helsinki. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3.  The applicant alleged, in particular, that his right to a fair trial and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing had been violated as his appeal in the Appeal Court had been discontinued due to the fact that he had not attended a hearing in person but had been represented by his counsel.

4.  On 30 June 2008 the Acting President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3).

THE FACTS

I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Helsinki.

6.  On 24 February 2004 the applicant was convicted of aggravated fraud by the Tuusula District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) and sentenced to conditional imprisonment for one year and eight months.

7.  On 25 March 2004 the applicant appealed to the Helsinki Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten) requesting, inter alia, that an oral hearing be held. The other defendants and one of the complainants also appealed to the Appeal Court.

8.  On 28 December 2004, after having received written observations from the parties, the Appeal Court decided to hold an oral hearing. On 29 December 2004 the parties were summoned to attend the oral hearings which were to take place on 28 February, 14 to 16 March, 18 March, and 21 to 24 March 2005. It was stated in the decision and in the summons that the applicant was to appear in person at the hearing on all of those days, under penalty of a default fine. His presence was required due to his own appeal as well as the opposing parties' appeal and in order to be heard by the public prosecutor. However, the hearing of witnesses was to take place between 14 and 24 March 2005. Moreover, it was stated in the summons that, if the applicant were to be absent from the main hearing without a valid excuse and despite the penalty of a default fine being imposed, his appeal would be discontinued. As far as the opposing parties' appeal and the hearing by the public prosecutor were concerned, a new threat of a higher fine could be imposed on the applicant, he could be ordered to be brought to the same or a later hearing, and the case could be decided regardless of his absence. A valid excuse meant circumstances of force majeure or an illness certified by a medical certificate. Work or holiday reasons were normally not considered as valid reasons. The Appeal Court was to examine whether the excuse was valid.

9.  The summons was served on the applicant on 4 January 2005.

10.  The applicant did not attend the hearing on 28 February 2005 but was represented by his counsel. He could not be reached by telephone despite several attempts. The public prosecutor requested that the applicant be brought to the hearing but this was not done. The applicant's counsel indicated that the applicant could most likely be found at his home but that his presence at the hearing on 28 February 2005 was not necessary as it had been planned in advance that he would be heard only on 15 March 2005.

11.  On 28 February 2005 the Appeal Court decided, on the basis of Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure (oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken; Act no. 381/2003), that the applicant's appeal was to be discontinued due to his absence. It found that, since the applicant had not attended the hearing on 28 February 2005 or notified the court of a valid excuse for his absence, he had to be considered to have been absent even though his counsel had been present. It was stated in the decision that an ordinary appeal was not allowed but if the applicant had had a valid excuse that he had not been able to announce in time, he had the right to a reopening of the case on the basis of the same appeal, by notifying the Appeal Court in writing within thirty days of the decision to discontinue the appeal. If he could not provide a valid excuse, the case would be ruled inadmissible.

12.  On 15 March 2005 the applicant attended the hearing as planned and was questioned as a witness.

13.  On 24 March 2005 the applicant notified the Appeal Court in writing that he had had a valid excuse for his absence and that he wanted his case to be reopened. He claimed that the national provision in question, Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure, had been too strictly applied. He referred to a Supreme Court judgment in which the court had stated that it was not necessary to summon an applicant to appear in person unless his presence was strictly necessary, for example for questioning. According to the Supreme Court, the national provision in question should not be interpreted too strictly. If the applicant was absent from the main hearing but his presence was not deemed strictly necessary, his appeal should not be discontinued due to his absence.

14.  Furthermore, the applicant claimed that the above-mentioned provision most likely failed to comply with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. When the provision in question had last been amended, the Government had proposed some textual changes in order to reflect better the Court's case-law in this respect. These changes were not, however, accepted by the Parliament.

15.  Moreover, the applicant claimed that, as there were no rules on how national law was to be applied when the main hearing lasted for several days, a Convention-friendly approach should have been adopted. The Appeal Court had set up a procedural plan according to which the applicant was to be heard in person only on 15 March 2005. It was not indicated in the summons that even one day's absence would be regarded as absence from the whole main hearing. The applicant's presence at the hearing on 28 February 2005 was thus not strictly necessary and the Appeal Court should not have discontinued his appeal. The applicant had never intended to discontinue his appeal.

16.  In any event, the applicant claimed that he had had a valid excuse as he had been ill. He provided a medical certificate and two medical documents to that effect.

17.  On 21 June 2005 the Appeal Court rejected the applicant's notification. It found that the medical certificate had been dated eight days after the hearing and that the doctor had thus not examined the applicant's health on 28 February 2005. On that date, the applicant had not received any treatment in a hospital or in a similar medical institution. The applicant was suffering from a long-term illness and his treatment was estimated to last two to three years. Despite the applicant's state of health, he had been able to attend the hearing on 15 March 2005. His illness was thus not of a kind to constitute a valid excuse for absence. The applicant had time to prepare himself well in advance for the hearing and also to take the hearing into account when planning his treatment. Thus, the applicant had not shown that he had had a valid reason to be absent from the hearing on 28 February 2005 and he had no right to have his case reopened.

18.  On 18 August 2005 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), reiterating the grounds of appeal relied on before the Appeal Court and pointing out that the Appeal Court had taken no stand on his claims concerning national law and the Court's case-law.

19.  On 11 October 2005 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

20.  According to Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure (oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken; Act no. 81/2003), if the appellant is absent from the main hearing, the appeal shall be discontinued. According to Chapter 12, section 29 of the same Code (Act no. 1052/1991), a party who, in spite of having been ordered to appear in court in person, sends an attorney in his place without a valid excuse, shall be deemed to be absent.

21.  When the current provisions concerning appeals to the Appeal Court were amended in 2002 and 2003, the following was mentioned in the Government Proposal HE 91/2002 vp.:

“The provision [Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure] is interpreted [by the Supreme Court, KKO 2000:44] to mean that an appeal of an applicant summoned to appear in person is discontinued if he or she is absent from the main hearing even if he or she is represented by counsel. However, the European Court has on many occasions stated that it was of crucial importance for the fairness of the criminal justice system that the accused be adequately defended by counsel, in spite of having been properly summoned to appear in person. In its judgments of Lala and Pelladoah v. The Netherlands (application nos. 14861/89 and 16737/90, judgment of 22 September 1994, points 34 and 40) and Van Geyseghem v. Belgium (application no. 26103/95, judgment of 21 January 1999, points 33—35) as well as most recently in its judgment Stroek and Goedhart v. Belgium (application nos. 36449/97, 36467/97 and 34989/97, judgment of 20 March 2001), the European Court stated that an accused does not lose this right to be defended effectively by a lawyer merely on account of not attending a court hearing. It is immaterial whether the absence is due to a valid excuse or whether an appeal is possible. It is also immaterial that the defendant was adequately defended in the lower instance. The judgment in the Van Geyseghem case concerned an action for recovery of a higher court judgment which was given in absentia. The applicant, who was an accused in the criminal proceedings, was represented by her counsel in the recovery proceedings. The higher court "declared the application void". The proceedings were thus similar to those in Finland when an appeal is discontinued. On the other hand, in its judgment of Eliazer v. The Netherlands (application no. 38055/97, judgment of 16 October 2001, point 35), the European Court found no violation when counsel was heard and the case was decided thereafter. In the light of the above Court's case-law, it is not entirely clear what should be done regarding an appeal of an applicant who is an accused in criminal proceedings and who, despite being summoned, does not appear in person at the main hearing.”

22.  However, it was proposed that Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure be amended so that an appeal by an applicant summoned to appear in person would no longer be discontinued if he or she were absent from the main hearing but represented by counsel. It was felt that it was better that the applicant in such situations received a decision on material rather than procedural grounds.

23.  The Parliamentary Legal Committee estimated, however, in its report LaVM 27/2002 vp., that as it was debatable whether these amendments were necessary, and since they were causing inconvenience for the functioning of the appeal courts, the amendments should not be adopted. The proposed amendments were thus withdrawn.

24.  The Supreme Court took a stand on this issue in its judgment of 1 October 2004 (KKO 2004:94). It found, inter alia, the following:

“13. The European Court has in many judgments stated that it was of crucial importance for the fairness of the criminal justice system that the accused be adequately defended, and that he could not be deprived of this right merely on account of not attending a court hearing. According to the Court, even if the legislature had to be able to discourage unjustified absences, it could not penalise them by creating exceptions to the right to legal assistance (see Poitrimol v. France, judgment of 23 November 1993, Lala v. The Netherlands and Pelladoah v. The Netherlands, judgments of 22 September 1994, as well as Van Geyseghem v. Belgium, judgment of 21 January 1999, Van Pelt v. France, judgment of 23 May 2000 and Goedhart v. Belgium, judgment of 20 March 2001).

......

16. When deciding in what situations a case can be examined only when the applicant is present in person and in what situations the applicant has the right to defend himself through legal assistance of his choosing, one has to distinguish different situations in the criminal proceedings. If the applicant is heard in order to clarify the matter, his presence in person is necessary. When, however, other witnesses are heard or the parties are heard in order to assess legally the act described in the indictment or the defence, it is appropriate that questioning is undertaken and the statements are given by a legal representative. It is also clear that when the applicant exercises his right to question or to give legal statements, he cannot be deprived of his right to use legal assistance and that his presence in person in those situations is not necessary. Therefore, the applicant should not be obliged to appear in person under penalty of a default fine unless the outcome of the case might depend on the reliability of his account or his presence in person is necessary for some other reason.

17. According to the provisions concerning the proceedings in appeal courts, an appeal court cannot, without any particular grounds, change the district court's conclusions concerning the evidence if persons meant to be heard as witnesses are absent from the main hearing. The starting point is that a higher instance should have the same possibility to assess the oral testimony as a district court, the correctness of whose judgment is being assessed by the higher instance. This means, inter alia, that the principle of immediate presentation of evidence must be applied also on appeal. It does not follow from the wording of Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure, nor did it follow from it at the time when the Appeal Court examined the case, that an appeal should always be entirely discontinued when the applicant is absent from the main hearing, even though summoned to appear in person. The court which has the right and the obligation to conduct the proceedings can and indeed must then decide whether the examination of some parts of the appeal by hearing only counsel is necessary or reasonable. When considering this, the court must take into account the applicant's justified legal expectations. If it becomes clear that the applicant's presence in person is, in spite of the given order, not necessary, his appeal should not in this kind of situation be even partly discontinued due to his absence.”

THE LAW

I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 6 § 3 (C) OF THE CONVENTION

25.  The applicant complained that his right to a fair trial and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing had been violated as his appeal in the Appeal Court had been discontinued due to the fact that he had not attended the hearing on 28 February 2005 but was represented by his counsel. He claimed, referring to the Court's case-law, that the provision on the basis of which his appeal was discontinued, namely Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure, was contrary to the requirements of the Convention.

26.  He invoked Articles 6 § 1 and 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention, which read in the relevant parts as follows:

“1.  In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...

3.  Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

(c)  to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.”

27.  The Government contested these arguments.

A.  Admissibility

28.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

B.  Merits

29.  The applicant pointed out that, according to the Court's case-law, an accused could not be deprived of his or her right to legal assistance solely on the ground that he or she had not attended a hearing. Even though the legislator had a power to prevent unjustified absences, it could not penalise them by creating exceptions to the right to legal assistance. An accused's right to legal assistance was not dependent on his or her behaviour. In the present case, the content of the summons had been unclear. Moreover, the hearing on 28 February 2005 was not connected to the rest of the hearing and it was not even intended that the applicant would be heard on that day. Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure did not comply with the requirements of the Convention and it had not been interpreted in a Convention-friendly manner in the applicant's case.

30.  The Government maintained that an oral hearing in an appeal court was an immediate and uninterrupted court session although it would have been held over several days. The hearing could be cancelled if, inter alia, the defendant failed to appear and the case could not be decided notwithstanding this failure. The relevant domestic legislation was in accordance with the requirements of the Convention. Moreover, Chapter 26, section 20, subsection 1, of the Code of Judicial Procedure was flexible and allowed Convention-friendly interpretation. In the present case the applicant's hearing in person had been necessary and he had been made aware of the consequences of his absence. As the applicant could not be contacted by telephone during the oral hearing, he could not be brought to court.

31.  The Court points out that it is of capital importance that a defendant should appear, both because of his right to a hearing and because of the need to verify the accuracy of his statements and compare them with those of the victim, whose interests need to be protected, and of the witnesses. The legislature must accordingly be able to discourage unjustified absences (see Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, § 35, Series A no. 277-A). However, it is also of crucial importance for the fairness of the criminal justice system that the accused be adequately defended, both at first instance and on appeal (see Lala v. the Netherlands, 22 September 1994, § 33, Series A no. 297-A; and Pelladoah v. the Netherlands, 22 September 1994, § 40, Series A no. 297-B). The latter interest prevails and consequently the fact that a defendant, in spite of having been properly summoned, does not appear, cannot – even in the absence of an excuse – justify depriving him of his right under Article 6 § 3 of the Convention to be defended by counsel (see Lala v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 33; and Pelladoah v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 40). It is for the courts to ensure that a trial is fair and, accordingly, that counsel who attends trial for the apparent purpose of defending the accused in his absence is given the opportunity to do so (see Lala v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 34; and Pelladoah v. the Netherlands, cited above, § 41).

32.  The right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be defended effectively by a lawyer is one of the basic features of a fair trial. An accused does not lose this right merely on account of not attending a court hearing. Even if the legislature must be able to discourage unjustified absences, it cannot penalise them by creating exceptions to the right to legal assistance. The legitimate requirement that defendants must attend court hearings can be satisfied by means other than deprivation of the right to be defended (see Van Geyseghem v. Belgium [GC], no. 26103/95, § 34, ECHR 1999-I.).

33.  Moreover, the Court reiterates that the right to a fair trial, guaranteed under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, comprises inter alia the right of the parties to the proceedings to present the observations which they regard as pertinent to their case. As the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective (see Artico v. Italy, 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37), this right can be regarded as effective only if the applicant is in fact “heard”, that is, his observations are properly examined by the courts. Article 6 § 1 of the Convention places the courts, inter alia, under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 19 April 1994, § 59, Series A no. 288; Dulaurans v. France, no. 34553/97, § 33, 21 March 2000; and Virgil Ionescu v. Romania, no. 53037/99, § 44, 28 June 2005; in the context of the right to access to a court see Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 80, ECHR 2004-I; and Albina v. Romania, no. 57808/00, § 30, 28 April 2005; and in the context of the applicant's right to a re-examination of his conviction see Nedzela v. France, no. 73695/01, §§ 55-56, 27 July 2006).

34.  The principles established in the above-mentioned cases apply to the present case. It was the Helsinki Appeal Court's duty to allow the applicant's counsel, who attended the hearing, to defend him, even in his absence. That was particularly true in this case as the Appeal Court had set up a procedural plan according to which witnesses were to be heard only from 14 March 2005 onwards. Although the intended scope of the hearing on 28 February 2005 is not entirely clear, it apparently did not concern any issues for which the applicant's attendance in person was strictly necessary. In addition, the hearing was to last several days and it had not been indicated in the summons that even one day's absence would be regarded as absence from the whole main hearing. In these circumstances, the discontinuation of the applicant's case despite the fact that his counsel had been present on 28 February 2005 constituted a particularly rigid and heavy sanction for his absence which cannot be considered justifiable, having regard to the rights of the defence and the requirements of the fair trial.

35.  In conclusion, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention.

II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

36.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

A.  Damage

37.  The applicant considered that the best just satisfaction would be restitutio in integrum as far as possible, which would mean reopening his case at the domestic level. The reopening would be the only way to be awarded compensation for pecuniary damage. Therefore the applicant claimed no award under this head. As to non-pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR).

38.  The Government pointed out that the respondent States remained free, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, to choose the means of complying with their obligations to put an applicant, as far as possible, in the position in which he or she would have been had there been no violation of the Convention requirements. Under Chapter 31, sections 1 and 2, of the Code of Judicial Proceedings a case could be reopened under certain circumstances. As to the non-pecuniary damage, the Government contested the applicant's claim as being too high as to quantum and considered that the reasonable compensation should not exceed EUR 2,000.

39.  The Court accepts that the lack of guarantees of Article 6 has caused the applicant non-pecuniary damage which cannot be made good by the mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court therefore awards the applicant EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The Court considers that the award of non-pecuniary damage provides a sufficient redress in this case.

B.  Costs and expenses

40.  The applicant also claimed EUR 4,464.71 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

41.  The Government maintained that no specification related to all costs and expenses, as required by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, had been submitted but left it to the Court's discretion whether the documentation provided was sufficient in this respect. Costs such as postage, telephone and copying costs should not be compensated as they were included in counsel's fee. In any event, the total amount of compensation for costs and expenses should not exceed EUR 2,500 (inclusive of value-added tax).

42.  According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,000 (inclusive of value-added tax) for the proceedings before the Court.

C.  Default interest

43.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1.  Declares the application admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 taken together with Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention;

3.  Holds

(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:

(i)  EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii)  EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 22 September 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Fatoş Aracı Nicolas Bratza 
 Deputy Registrar President

KARI-PEKKA PIETILÄINEN v. FINLAND JUDGMENT

KARI-PEKKA PIETILÄINEN v. FINLAND JUDGMENT