Landsforeningen KRIM har gennem en årrække udtalt bekymring for, at
kriminaliteten ikke reduceres men derimod forøges af den
systematiske forråelse og brutalisering af straffesystemet i
Danmark, som politikerne - navnlig siden 2001 - har gennemført ved
at sende flere mennesker i fængsel i længere tid og ved at
gennemføre flere tiltag, der nedværdiger og krænker de indsatte i
fængslerne. Initiativer med flere indgreb i form af
telefonaflytninger, visitationszoner mv. øger efter KRIMs opfattelse
risikoen for, at almindelige mennesker får mindre sympati for
politiets arbejde blandt andet med den virkning, at almindelige
mennesker taber lysten til at bidrage med relevante oplysninger til
politiets efterforskning af kriminalitet. Landsforeningen KRIM har
til støtte for sine udtalelser blandt andet henvist til de
betydelige stigninger i anmeldelserne af grov vold, som er set i den
periode, hvor Lene Espersen var justitsminister.
I USA har politikerne i en årrække øget straffene betydeligt i
forsøget på at reducere forskellige former for kriminalitet herunder
bandekriminalitet (såkaldt "gang crime"). Det har vist sig, at de
øgede straffe blandt andet har øget sammenholdet i banderne, og at
unge, der formentlig af egen drift ville være gledet ud af livet i
banderne, under opholdet i fængsel i højere grad nagles fast til
bandetilværelsen. De bliver stemplet som bandemedlemmer, og
indretter sig således på et liv i banderne og et liv i kriminalitet.
The Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard
Law School, udgav 6. marts 2008 publikationen "No More Children Left
Behind Bars - A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime
Prevention". Side 12 og 13 indeholder en oversigt over forskning
vedrørende effekten af øgede fængselsstraffe mod deltagere i
kriminelle bander.
Heraf fremgår det blandt andet, at børns og teenagers tilknytning
til bander ofte er kortvarig, og mange af dem ikke når at begå
alvorlig kriminalitet. Forskerne påpeger risikoen for, at disse unge
mennesker gennem straffesystemet absorberes i bandemiljøet, og at
de, hvis de ikke får kontakt med straffesystemet, uden videre af sig
selv glider ud af bandemiljøet igen.
Der henvises til en rapport fra 2007, der antager, at en øget
politimæssig indsats, øgede beføjelser til anklagemyndigheden og
længere fængselsstraffe kan have den modsatte virkning end den
tiltænkte, idet fængselsstraffene øger sammenholdet i banderne og
giver større "bande-identifikation" hos de personer, der straffes.
Undersøgelser viser også at mellem halvdelen og 2/3 dele af
bandemedlemmerne deltager i et år eller mindre, og at de ikke er
livsvarige medlemmer. Det påpeges, at fængselsstraffe sikrer unge en
høj grad af samvær med asociale kammerater og en mindre grad af
samvær med velfungerende unge. Dette er en væsentlig risikofaktor.
Det konkluderes, at unge, der ellers ville have forladt banderne
hurtigt, ved at blive stemplet som bandemedlemmer og ved at komme i
fængsel sammen med mere hærdede bandemedlemmer, blot bliver mere
involveret i bandelivet. Forskeren Malcolm Klein bekræfter dette og
peger på, at særlige indsatser mod bandemedlemmer blot gør den
banderelaterede kriminalitet værre ved at forstærke sammenholdet i
sådanne grupper.
Teksten gengives uforkortet og på originalsprog med de tilhørende
noter umiddelbart nedenfor: |
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". ...For children and teens,
gang affiliation is often transient and marginal, meaning that many
children come into a gang for a short period and then leave, never
really committing to the gang or committing serious crimes. This
demonstrates the risk of non-violent, non-dangerous young people
getting swept up in a criminal justice system when they might have
easily been redirected to more constructive and less expensive
alternatives.41
Research on gang formation and affiliation strongly
suggests that expanded law enforcement, expanded prosecutorial power
and longer sentences could produce the opposite of their intended
effects. Specifically, a 2007 report from the Justice Policy
Institute details the way in which increased arrests and longer
sentences actually create more cohesive and stronger gang
identification.42
Research demonstrates that half to two-thirds of
gang members are affiliated for one year or less and are not members
"for life."43 The weight of the research on gang formation suggests
that policies that more strongly identify youth as "gang" members
could backfire because the increase in arrests and longer sentences
actually create more cohesive and stronger identification with
gangs.44 Research finds that the strongest predictors of sustained
gang affiliation are a high level of interaction with antisocial
peers and a low level of interaction with pro-social peers.45
Thus, for peripheral gang members who would
otherwise be inclined to leave a gang after a short period, being
publicly labeled as a "gang" member and spending time detained with
more entrenched gang members would only solidify gang membership.
This conclusion is echoed by Malcolm Klein, noted gang researcher
and Professor Emeritus at the University of Southern California.
Klein’s research suggests that gang crackdowns actually make
gang-related violence worse by strengthening the cohesiveness of
these groups.46
The Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency and
Prevention’s 2004 review on the causes and correlates of juvenile
delinquency concluded that while arrest and sanctions can be
justified based on the immediate need to protect public safety,
"arrest and subsequent sanctions generally have not been a
particularly viable strategy for the prevention of future
delinquency..."47 To the contrary, "The findings also suggest that
the use of the least restrictive sanctions, within the limits of
public safety, and enhanced reentry assistance, monitoring and
support may reduce future delinquency."48
The inefficiency of arrest and sanctions in stemming
youth crime and delinquency is well-established. For example, a 2007
report from the Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice
states: "Research by criminologists over the past several years has
shown that punitive consequences do not, in fact, reduce criminal
behavior and in some cases actually increase it."49 An exhaustive
review by the National Center on Education, Disability and Juvenile
Justice cites empirical studies and concludes: " Incarceration
is a spectacularly unsuccessful treatment..."50
Similarly, a wealth of research specific to "gang
crackdowns" in the 80s and 90s demonstrates that prosecution and
punishment policies will likely prove ineffective at stemming crime.
Research over the past 30 years has shown little or no crime control
effects from attempts to increase suppression and prosecution of
gang members.51
A study team from Mitre Corporation found that a tough arrest and
prosecution program in Los Angeles, known as Operation Hardcore, did
indeed net more arrests and prosecutions, but produced no evidence
that the crackdown decreased gang activity in the targeted areas.52
...."
Note 41 til 52:
41 Judith Greene & Kevin Pranis, Gang Wars: The
Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public
Safety Strategies 6 (Justice Policy Institute Report, July
2007), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/07-07_REp_GangWars_GC-PS-AC-JJ.pdf
[hereinafter JPI Report 2007].
42 See generally JPI Report 2007.
43 See OJJDP Bulletin at 4.
44 See JPI Report 2007 at 6 ("Heavy-handed
suppression efforts can increase gang cohesion.") and at 50 citing a
Denver Youth Survey by Huizinga that gang members see incarceration
as, "… a right of passage…." And some said "they learned things,
especially while incarcerated, and made contacts." Furthermore,
"Gang control policies that fix the gang label on youth do just the
opposite: they keep former gang members from acquiring the social
capital they need in order to survive in mainstream society." Id.
at 51.
45See OJJDP Bulletin at 5 citing research by
Battin-Pearson et al., 1997. While the terms pro and anti-social are
not explicitly defined where they are referenced in the cited
article, the term "delinquent" and "anti-social" tend to be used
synonymously in the literature. "Pro-social" apparently refers to
stronger school commitment, stronger attachment to parents and less
impulsive, risk seeking and deviant behavior. See
Battin-Pearson, et al., Early predictors of sustained adolescent
gang membership, Paper presented at the American Society of
Criminology Annual Meeting, San Diego, CA (1997).
46 Malcolm W. Klein, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG: ITS
NATURE, PREVALENCE, AND CONTROL (Oxford University Press 1995).
47 See Terrence P. Thornberry, David Huizinga
& Rolf Loeber, The Causes and Correlates Studies: Findings and
Policy Implications, 9 JUVENILE JUSTICE (2004). Available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/203555/jj2.html.
48 Id.
49 Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice
Annual Recommendations Report to the President and Congress of the
United States 3 (Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice
2007), available at http://www.facjj.org/annualreports/ccFACJJ%20Report%20508.pdf.
50 See Peter E. Leone, Christine A. Christle,
C. Michael Nelson, Russell Skiba, Andy Frey & Kristine Jolivette,
School Failure, Race, and Disability: Promoting Positive Outcomes,
Decreasing Vulnerability for Involvement with the Juvenile Justice
Delinquency System 3 (National Center of Education, Disability
and Juvenile Justice, October 2003).
51 See generally JPI Report, 2007; Also see
Krisberg, B. Austin, J., and Steele, P.S. 1989. Unlocking
Juvenile Corrections. San Francisco, CA: National Council on
Crime and Delinquency; Klein, M. 1995. THE AMERICAN STREET
GANG: ITS NATURE, PREVALENCE AND CONTROL. New York: Oxford
University Press.; Krisberg, B, Austin, J., Joe, K, and Steele, P.A.
1988. The Impact of Juvenile Court Sanctions. San Francisco, CA:
National Council on Crime and Delinquency.;Krisberg, B., Currie, E.,
Onek, D., and Wiebush, R. 1995. Graduated sanctions for serious,
violent, and chronic juvenile offenders. In SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND
CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
52 Dahmann, J. 1981. Operation Hardcore, A Prosecutorial
Response to Violent Gang Criminality: Interim Evaluation Report.
Washington, DC: Mitre Corporation. Reprinted in The Modern Gang
Reader, edited by M.A. Klein, C.L. Maxson, and J. Miller, 1995.
Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, pp. 301–303. |